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Abstract
XML and Web Services security speciﬁcations deﬁne elements to incorporate security tokens within
a SOAP message. We propose a method for mapping such messages to an abstract syntax in the
style of Dolev-Yao, and in particular Casper notation. We show that this translation preserves
ﬂaws and attacks. Therefore we provide a way for all the methods, and speciﬁcally Casper and
FDR, that have been developed in the last decade by the theoretical community for the analysis of
cryptographic protocols to be used for analysing WS-Security protocols. Finally, we demonstrate
how this technique can be used to prove properties and discover attacks upon a proposed Microsoft
WS-SecureConversation protocol.
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1 Introduction
Web Services is an XML-based architecture that has been developed in or-
der to make the coupling between distributed components looser. In the last
few years, with the growth of the popularity and importance of the Web Ser-
vices architecture, more and more standards have been deﬁned for extending
the functionality and for dealing with diﬀerent concerns. Due to its growing
importance and the uses to which it is put, Web Services requires rigorous
security.
A common way of achieving security is relying on a secure transport layer,
typically SSL as was studied and analysed in [7]. Apart from the fact that
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this technique provides security only in a secure channel (and not in ﬁles or
databases), it does not correspond with the WS architecture in which the
intermediaries can manipulate the message on its way. Once using a secure
transport layer intermediaries are not able to control the messages.
A more suitable way is using the WS-Security speciﬁcation [4] that by using
the XML-signature [10] and XML-encryption [11] speciﬁcations, deals with
and deﬁnes standards and ways of securing SOAP messages [9] without relying
on a secure transport layer. In eﬀect it creates a new sphere for cryptographic
protocols in terms of design and implementation.
In [14] we claimed that in the Dolev-Yao [12] model the syntax of the
SOAP message has relatively 2 little eﬀect on the security of the protocol and
therefore that an abstracted view of the protocol, taken that it encapsulates all
the security elements, provides an accurate model. We suggested a mapping
function φ (see Appendix I of the full paper [15] for details) 3 from SOAP
messages to Casper [20] input, such that if a WS-Security protocol contains
the messages m1, m2..., mn then,
(i) If an attack is found on φ(m1), φ(m2), . . . , φ(mn) then a corresponding
attack can be reproduced on m1, m2, . . . , mn.
(ii) If an attack exists on m1, m2, . . . , mn then it also exists on φ(m1), φ(m2),
. . . , φ(mn)
We demonstrated how, using property (1) of φ, we could use Casper [20]
and the FDR reﬁnement checker [22] to ﬁnd two attacks on WSS protocols
proposed by Oasis in [19].
In this paper we prove property (2) of φ and conﬁrm our last claim. We
then demonstrate how we can use this property together with the Data Inde-
pendence and internalising techniques of [8] to provide general proofs of Web
Services Security protocols as well as ﬁnding vulnerabilities.
The contribution we make is a formal translation of WS-Security proto-
cols to traditional cryptographic protocols, ensuring that ﬂaws and attacks are
preserved. Therefore we provide a way for all the methods, and speciﬁcally
Casper and FDR, that have been developed in the last decade by the theo-
retical community for the analysis of cryptographic protocols to be used for
analysing WS-Security. We also prove (Lemma 4.2) that, in the case of any
addition of deductive rules to the traditional model for encapsulating addi-
tional capabilities of the intruder, φ continues to satisfy property (2). Finally,
2 We showed a case in which SOAP can help, but in fact this just increases the faithfulness
of the translation.
3 The deﬁnition of φ in the full paper is more elaborated than the one in the original paper
and it aims to support any WSS protocol
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we create a framework in which the addition of rules for manipulating XML
elements can be proven to not detract from the correctness of property (2) of
φ (see section 5 for example). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst
work proving the relationship between WS-Security protocols and traditional
security protocols.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give a short overview of
the CSP model of traditional security protocols. In Section 3 we indicate how
the traditional model can be extended to encapsulate WS-Security protocols.
In Section 4 we prove that φ’s property (2) holds. In Section 5 we show how
to produce a general proof of correctness of WS-Security protocol using our
technique and in particular we prove some properties of a Microsoft protocol
based on the WS-SecureConversation [2] speciﬁcation, we then reveal some
ﬂaws letting an intruder exercise diﬀerent sort of attacks. Finally we conclude
and give the outline of our planned future work in this area.
This paper is an outline of [15], where many details omitted here can be
found.
2 Modelling traditional security protocols in CSP
In this section we describe how a security protocol is modelled using CSP and
how the model allows us to reason about it.
2.1 The Message datatype
The datatype Message represents the messages exchanged between the diﬀer-
ent agents. It is based on a set atoms called Atom where the sets Key (contains
all the cryptographic keys), Nonce, Text and Password are deﬁned to be sub-
sets of the atom set (Key⊆Atom, Nonce⊆Atom and Password⊆Atom). In
addition, we deﬁne HashFn to be the set that contains all the available cryp-
tographic hash functions. The datatype Message is composed of sequencing,
referencing, encrypting and hashing the atomic value in Atom and deﬁned by:
Message ::= Encrypt.Key.Message |
Hash.HashFn.Message |
Reference.Key |
Sq.Message∗ |
Atom.Atom
In this paper we will use the Casper notation of writing {m}k for Encrypt.k.m.
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We will use g(|m|) for Hash.g.m, R(K) for modelling a reference to a key K
and ﬁnally will abbreviate Sq.〈 m1,. . . ,mn〉 to 〈 m1,. . . ,mn〉. For example, we
will denote the construct Encrypt.k.(Sq.〈a,na〉) by {a,na}k.
2.2 Trustworthy agents
Every agent taking a part in the protocol is modelled as a CSP process (An
agent can also be internalised in the intruder deduction set [8] but for now
we will assume that all the honest agents are implemented as CSP processes.)
We deﬁne the process PA denoting agent A, using the following events:
• send.A.B.M - symbolises agent A sending message M to agent B.
• receive.A.B.M - symbolises agent B receiving message M apparently from
A.
In addition we deﬁne the following events for delineating speciﬁcations for
the protocol we want to analyse. See [20] for more details about how these
events are used to express properties of security protocols.
• claimSecret.A.B.M symbolises that A thinks that message M is a secret
shared only with agent B.
• running.A.B.{M1,. . . ,Mn} symbolises that A thinks he started a new run of
the protocol with B where {M1,. . . ,Mn} represent some details of this run.
• ﬁnish.A.B.{M1,. . . ,Mn} symbolises that A thinks he has just ﬁnished a run
of the protocol with B where {M1,. . . ,Mn} represent some details of this
run.
For more information regarding the translation of a protocol description
to a CSP representation see [25].
2.3 Modelling the intruder and putting the network together
Based on the Dolev-Yao model [12] we allow the intruder to have the following
abilities when attacking a set T of trusted agents: (i) overhearing all the
messages ﬂowing through the network, (ii) intercepting messages, (iii) faking
messages based on what he knows limited only by cryptography, and (iv)
behaving as would any agent outside of T . We ﬁrst deﬁne the rules that allow
the intruder to construct new messages. The deﬁnition is based on the relation
 which characterises deduction rules by which the intruder can deduce new
messages. We say that B  M if message M can be deduced from the set of
messages B.
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member
B ∈ M ⇒ B  M
sequencing
B  {M1, . . . ,Mn} ⇒ 〈M1, . . . ,Mn〉
splitting
B  〈. . . ,M, . . .〉 ⇒ B  M
encrypting
B  M ∧ B Atom K ∧K ∈ Key ⇒ B  {M}K
decrypting
B  {M}K ∧ B Atom K
−1 ⇒ B  M
hashing
B  M ∧ g ∈ HashFn ⇒ B  g(|M |)
referencing
B  K ∧K ∈ Key ⇒ B  R(K)
Informally, the intruder can form an encryption when he knows the message
and the key. He can decipher an encryption for which he knows the inverse
of the key, create a reference to a key that he knows, hash every message he
knows and can both break up and form sequences.
Since by the Dolev-Yao model the intruder should be able to overhear,
intercept and block each message, the intruder process also models the com-
munication medium.
The process representing the intruder is parameterised by X, which ranges
over subsets of Message, and represents all the facts the intruder has learned.
In this model the intruder gets every message sent by the honest agents or
by the server via the send channel. He then can pass it to the agents via the
appropriate receive channel unless he decides to block it or fake a new message
instead.
Intruder(X)=̂ M∈Messagesend?A?B!M → Intruder(X ∪ {M})

M∈Message,XMreceive?A?B!M → Intruder(X)

M∈Message,XM leak.M → Intruder(X)
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The initial state of the intruder is Intruder(IIK) where IIK is the Intruder
Initial Knowledge. The complete system is then 4 :
SY STEM =̂ (|||A∈HonestPA) ‖ INTRUDER(IIK)
2.4 Specifying Protocol requirements
The requirements of the protocols are encapsulated by trace speciﬁcations.
Secrecy
As mentioned before, when agent A performs the event claimSecret.A.B.
Secs it means that we believe, at this point in the protocol run, that the
values in the set Secs are secret and shared only with agent B. It expresses
the expectation that the intruder cannot be in possession of values from Secs,
i.e. the intruder should not be able to perform leak.M where M∈ Secs.
Authentication
We ﬁrst introduce the ﬁnish and running events (see [25] for more details). 5
The ﬁnish event is performed by the honest agents when they complete a
protocol run and the running event should be performed before the last send
event.
We will use the following deﬁnition [21] which is one of the more common
forms of authentication:
If A thinks he has completed a run of the protocol, apparently with B, then
B has previously been running the protocol, apparently with A, and both
agents agreed as to which roles they took, and both agreed as to the values
of the variables v1, . . . , vn, and there is a one-one relationship between the
runs of B and the runs of A.
The following speciﬁcation corresponds to this deﬁnition 6 :
AgreementAgreementSet(tr)=̂
∀A ∈ Agent;B ∈ Honest;Ms ∈ AgreementSet •
tr ↓ finished.A.B.Ms ≤ tr ↓ running.B.A.Ms
4 For clarity this model is abstracted. In the model generated by Casper each fact is mod-
elled as a process parallelled with the entire fact space. This technique reduced dramatically
the state space that FDR needs to explore (see [25] for more details).
5 notice that [25] refers to these events as Running and Commit
6 The binary operator ↓ (tr↓ e) represents the number of occurrences of event e in a trace
tr
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3 Creating a CSP model of WSS Protocols
In order to analyse Web Services Security protocols we have to extend the
model that was described in Section 2. We will later use the new extended
WSS model to prove Property (2) of φ.
The WSS model is similar to the one in Section 2. There are essentially
has diﬀerences. Firstly, we need to replace the Message datatype with a
new datatype which encapsulates SOAP messages. Secondly, a new set of
deductions must be added to the intruder’s deduction set to enable him to
“understand” the XML tagging system underlying the SOAP messages.
3.1 The Envelope datatype
The Envelope datatype represents the SOAP messages that are sent and
received by the agents. Similarly to the Message datatype, Envelope will
be based on the Atom set where Key⊆Atom, Nonce⊆Atom, Agent⊆Atom,
TimeStamp⊆Atom, Password⊆Atom and on HashFn, the set that contains
all the cryptographic hash functions. In addition, we deﬁne HeaderApp to be
the set of all the applicative SOAP headers, BodyApp to be the set of the
applicative sub-element of the Body element, Id is the set of all the unique ids
and Element to enclose all the valid SOAP elements. Some sample clauses
from the deﬁnition of Envelope follow. The complete deﬁnition of Envelope is
presented in the full paper.
Envelope ::= <Envelope.Attributes.>.EnvelopeContent.</Envelope>
EnvelopeContent ::= Header | Body | 〈Header, Body〉 |
〈Header, EncryptedData〉
Header ::= <Header.Attributes.>.HeaderContent.</Header>
HeaderAtom ::= Security | HeaderApp |
EncryptedData
HeaderContent ::= Sq.HeaderAtom∗
Security ::= <Security.Attributes.>.SecurityTokens.</Security>
SecurityToken ::= UsernameToken | BinarySecurityToken |
Signature | ReferenceList | EncryptedKey |
EncryptedData | SecurityTokenReference
SecurityTokens ::= Sq.SecurityToken∗
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The Envelope datatype illustrates the SOAP messages almost down to the
last detail. However, we make some abstractions in order to make it more
concise, and clearer: details may be found in the full paper.
3.2 The intruder
The Intruder’s deﬁnition in the WSS model is very similar to the one in the
traditional model and is still based on the basic seven deduction rules pre-
sented in Section 2. The following is an some example of the added deductions
(called WS*) that provide the intruder the ability to manipulate the SOAP’s
XML-based elements (for the complete set see the full paper [15]).
WSEncryptedKey1
B  <EncryptedKey.Attributes.>.
〈<KeyInfo>.R(K1).</KeyInfo>,
<CipherData>.{K2}K1.</CipherData>,
Sq.Element∗
〉.
</EncryptedKey> ⇒
B  {K2}K1 ∧B  R(K1)
The complete WSS system is then similar to the one presented in Section 2:
SY STEMWSS =̂ (|||A∈HonestPA) ‖ INTRUDER(IIKWSS)
We remark that our reason for building a full CSP model of WSS is pri-
marily to allow the abstract analysis rather than to check it directly with
FDR.
4 Proving property (2) of φ
We can now give a formal deﬁnition of the function φ : Envelope → Message.
We are aiming to use he result of [17]. Therefore φ is designed as close as
possible to the idea of renaming transformation deﬁned there.
Note that since the Envelope datatype deﬁnition uses theMessage datatype
deﬁnition, φ might be applied to Message. In that case according to the deﬁ-
nition of φ (see full paper), φ behaves like the identical function, i.e. returns
its input.
φ is deﬁned over the events of SY STEMWSS as follows:
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φ(send.A.B.Envelope) =̂ send.A.B.φ(Envelope)
φ(receive.A.B.Envelope) =̂ receive.A.B.φ(Envelope)
φ(claimSecret.A.B.Envelope) =̂ claimSecret.A.B.φ(Envelope)
φ(running.A.B.Envelope) =̂ running.A.B.φ(Envelope)
φ(finished.A.B.Envelope) =̂ finished.A.B.φ(Envelope)
and over traces by:
φ(tr) =̂ 〈φ(e) | e ← tr〉
Applying φ to the trustworthy agent processes (φ(PA) | ∀A ∈ Honest) is
implicitly deﬁned since in CSP, the renamed process f(P ) is the process that
behaves like P except the fact that every event e in P is renamed to f(e).
Finally, we apply φ to the whole system:
φ(SY STEMwss) =̂ (|||A∈Honestφ(PA)) ‖ INTRUDER(φ(IIKwss))
4.1 Fault-Preserving renaming transformations
In [17] Hui and Lowe prove that if SYSTEM is transformed into SYSTEM ′
in the following way:
SY STEM ′ =̂ (|||A∈Honestf(PA)) ‖ INTRUDER(IIK
′)
where IIK’ is the new initial knowledge that was given to the intruder in the
transformed system, then f is fault-preserving if it satisﬁes the following two
conditions:
(i) ∀B ∈ P(Message);M ∈ Message•B∪IIK  M ⇒ f(B)∪IIK ′  f(M)
(ii) f(IIK) ⊆ IIK ′
Informally, if the intruder can deduce a message in the original SYSTEM
he must be able to deduce the equivalent message f(M) in the correspond-
ing SYSTEM ′, in this case we say that function f satisﬁes the distribution
property. Secondly, the corresponding messages of all of the intruder’s ini-
tial knowledge in the original SYSTEM must be possessed by the intruder in
SYSTEM ′.
The proof of this result does not rely on the structure of the Message
datatype or the deduction set of the intruder. In other words, the result
is valid regardless of the type of messages the agents exchange and of the
deductions the intruder has. Thanks to this fact we can apply this result to
the WSS model. Therefore, in order to prove property (2) of φ, it is enough
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to prove that:
(i) ∀B ∈ P(Envelope); E ∈ Envelope •B ∪ IIKwss  E ⇒ φ(B) ∪ IIKwss 
φ(E)
(ii) φ(IIKwss) ⊆ φ(IIKwss)
The second condition is obviously satisﬁed. What remains to be proven is that
φ satisﬁes the distribution property which we prove by structural induction
over the deduction set of the intruder.
4.2 Proving φ satisﬁes the distribution property
For proving the distribution property we need the following Lemma taken from
[17]
Lemma 4.1 B  E ∧B ⊆ B′ ⇒ B′  E
B  E ∧ B ∪ {E}  E′ ⇒ B  E′.
We start by proving that φ satisﬁes the distribution property for all the
deductions taken from the original system.
Lemma 4.2 For every intruder’s deduction taken from the traditional system,
φ satisﬁes the distribution property.
Proof. If B  M ⇒ B  M′ for every M,M′ ∈ Message and for every
deduction rule from the traditional system, then by the inductive hypothesis,
B ∪ IIKwss  φ(M) = M and by the original deductive rule ⇒ B ∪ IIKwss 
M′ = φ(M′) ⇒ B ∪ IIKwss  φ(M
′) 
We complete the proof by proving that φ satisﬁes the distribution property
for the deductions added to WSS model. An example is given below, the rest
of the clauses may be found in the complete paper.
WSEncryptedKey1
If SE = <EncryptedKey>.
〈<KeyInfo>.R(K1).</KeyInfo>,
<CipherData>.{K2}K1 .</CipherData>,
Sq.Element∗
〉.
</EncryptedKey>
and B  SE, then by the inductive hypothesis, φ(B)∪ IIKwss  φ(SE) =
{K2}φ(<KeyInfo>.R(K1).</KeyInfo>,ENC), φ(<KeyInfo>.R(K1).</KeyInfo>) = {K2}K1,
R(K)=
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φ({K2}K1),φ(R(K)) ⇒ φ(B) ∪ IIKwss  φ({K2}K1) ∧ φ(B) ∪ IIKwss 
φ(R(K))
4.3 Agreement authentication property
We now prove that property (2) of φ is valid with respect to the agreement
property as well. In [17], it is proven that if the following condition is satisﬁed:
∀Es ∈ AgreementSet;Es′ ∈ Envelope • Es = Es′ ⇒ f(Es) = f(Es′)
then
¬AgreementAgreementSet(tr) ⇒ ¬Agreementf(AgreementSet)(f(tr))
Unfortunately, φ is not injective when applied to the KeyInfo, EncryptedData
and EncryptedKey if we use the usual equality over the datatype Envelope.
Moreover, SecurityTokenReference can often be replaced by the element it
points to and by that to create two diﬀerent SOAP messages in which their φ
transformation is identical. For those reasons, it looks that φ does not satisfy
the latter condition. It can however be shown that all equivalence classes
of messages which map to the same image over φ are, so far as security it
concerned, entirely equivalent and in particular the authentication properties
carried by any one of them is carried by them all. So we can proceed as if this
property did hold. See the full paper for more details.
4.4 Ramiﬁcations
We have established that φ is safe with respect to both secrecy and authenti-
cation under the WSS model. If one extends the WSS model by adding more
deduction rules, then the proof can be extended as well (see Section 5).
Since φ transforms the Envelopes into Messages, we don’t need the added
deduction rules from section 3 for analysing a protocol after it was transformed
by φ. Therefore a WSS protocol can be analysed in the traditional model
after it was transformed by φ without the worry of generating false proof of
correctness.
We would like to emphasise that although this proof is based on the the-
ory of CSP, it is valid for any tool regardless of its underlying theory. Con-
sequently, any established tool for analysing security protocols can use φ for
analysing WSS protocols.
φ’s input is the SOAP messages of the protocol to be analysed. This
fact allows the non-specialist user to analyse complex WSS protocols in a
few minutes. We have tested our automated version of φ on various WSS
protocols had received satisfying results. We will introduce a new tool in the
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future for analysing WSS protocols either using Casper and FDR or (subject
to adaptation) by other available tools.
As a result of Lemma 4.2 any extension of the intruder abilities made in
the traditional protocol model can be used when analysing WSS protocols
transformed by φ.
We saw in 4.3 that if there are two semantically equivalent but syntactically
diﬀerent WSS protocols then φ will transform them to the same traditional
protocol. Due to this character of φ it was suggested that φ can be used for
making the semantics of WSS clearer.
5 Proving the correctness of a WS-SecureConversation
based protocol
In the previous sections we presented our method of analysing WS-Security
Protocols. We have also implemented φ so that together with Casper and FDR
it makes a tool for analysing WS-Security protocols. However, the framework
that we created can be used for extending φ to encapsulate elements deﬁned
and by new Web Services speciﬁcations by local protocol designers.
In this section we give an example of extending φ to analyse a WS-
SecureConversation based protocol taken from WSE [23] (See the full SOAP
messages’ description in the full paper). We demonstrate how the extension
can be proven using the model we presented in Section 3 and provide a general
proof of correctness of this protocol using Casper and FDR.
5.1 Background
The Web Services Security speciﬁcation deﬁnes security tokens to provide
secrecy, authentication, integrity and other security properties to the claims
that these token encapsulate. Yet, the process of verifying these tokens against
the security policy has to be repeated for each SOAP message. This is ob-
viously problematic performance-wise, for example an EncryptedKey element
might be used in each message instead of agreeing upon a session key once.
WS-SecureConversation[2] addresses this issue. It builds upon WS-Security
and WS-Trust [3] to allow a requester and a Web Service to set up a mutu-
ally authenticated security context that can be used by two parties as their
session key or for deriving new keys. WS-Trust deﬁnes three diﬀerent ways
for establishing security context. In the end of each following procedure a
SecurityContextToken element (SCT) is created and the new security con-
text is associated with it.
(i) Security Context Token is created by a security token service
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(STS) - The context initiator sends a security token service (STS) a
RequestSecurityToken (RST) request, if the policy permits and the re-
quester’s requirements are met, a RequestSecurityTokenResponse (RS
TR) is returned. The RSTR contains RequestedSecurityToken speci-
fying a new SCT and a RequestedProofToken pointing to a “secret” to
be assigned to the SCT. The newly created security token is distributed
to other parties by the STS in a similar way (via RSTR).
(ii) Security Context is created by one of the agents and propagated
with a message - If an entity is trusted by other parties then it can
create an SCT and send a signed unsolicited RSTR to the other parties.
Once again, the RSTR contains RequestedSecurityToken specifying a
new SCT and a RequestedProofToken pointing to a “secret”.
(iii) Security Context created by negotiation - WS-Trust deﬁnes ways
for negotiating or exchanging sequence of messages on the contents of
the SCT (e.g. the shared secret) when it is needed. The negotiation is
done by the parties sending each other challenges before establishing the
Security context. WS-Trust deﬁnes a variety of challenges for example
one party might specify a fact and expect the other party to returned it
signed.
After the security context establishment, the parties may use this shared
secret with WS-Security for signing and encrypting messages. However, it is
recommended by the WS-SecureConversation speciﬁcation that derived keys
will be used for these purposes. In this case the DerivedKeyToken can be
used for indicating which derivation is used within a given message.
5.2 Modelling WS-SecureConversation
In this section we show how to create the necessary extension to φ for analysing
the WSE’s WS-SecureConversation based protocol. For brevity we don’t
present here the complete extension for dealing with collections of tokens and
negotiation although such an extension can made and proven. Below just two
of the extensions are given, rest of them, and the proof that the extension
keeps φ safe, can be found in the full paper.
5.2.1 RequestSecurityToken
The RequestSecurityToken element (RST) is deﬁned in the WS-Trust spec-
iﬁcation and is used by the WS-SecureConversation speciﬁcation for request-
ing security context token (SCT) 7 . The context attribute is an optional URI
7 Since RequestSecurityToken can be used for requesting any Security Token, when used
in the WS-SecureConversation context it should contain a TokenType element indicating
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speciﬁes a context for the request. All subsequent RSTR elements relating to
this request must carry this attribute.
φ(〈RequestSecurityToken Context = “Con”〉...〈/RequestSecurityToken〉)
= φ(〈Base〉...〈/Base〉), φ(〈Supporting〉...〈/Supporting〉),
φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉, “Con”)
When LifeTime is a child of the RequestSecurityToken element, it is ab-
stracted away since the responder’s decision and she may ignore the LifeTime
in the request.
5.2.2 Entropy
The Entropy element allows a requester and a responder to specify entropy
that is to be used in creating a key.
• If BinarySecret is the child of Entropy then
φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉) = K φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉, “Key”) = K
Where K = ψ(〈BinarySecret〉...〈/BinarySecret〉) is an abstracted secret
in BinarySecret.
• If EncryptedKey is the child of Entropy then
φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉) = φ(〈EncryptedKey〉...〈/EncryptedKey〉)
φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉, “Key”) =
φ(〈EncryptedKey〉...〈/EncryptedKey〉,ENC )
Finally if φ get the Entropy element and a context name as a parameter then
φ creates a context that can be extracted later by related RSTRs using ψ:
φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉, “Con”) =
φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉),Context(“Con”, φ(〈Entropy〉...〈/Entropy〉, “Key”))
5.3 Analysing the protocol
We applied φ to the WSS protocol (see Appendix III of the full paper) and
obtained:
that this is an SCT request.
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MSG 1. A→B: RST, UMI1, anonymous, B, ts1,
{sha1(ts1), sha1(SecurityToken-b8...,{K1}PK(B)),
sha1(RST), sha1(UMI1), sha1(anonymous),
sha1(B)}p-sha1(pass(A),NA+ts1),
sha1(password(A),NA,ts1), NA, ts1,{K1}PK(B)
MSG 2. B→A: RSTR, UMI2, UMI1, anonymous, ts2, {sha1(RSTR),
sha1(UMI2), sha1(UMI1), sha1(anonymous), (sha1(ts2),
sha1(uuid1, ts2’, {K2}K1)}SK(B),uuid1, ts2’, {K2}K1
MSG 3. A→B: UMI3, anonymous, B, ts3, (uuid1, ts2’),
{sha1(UMI3), sha1(anonymous), sha1(B), sha1(ts3),
sha1(body1)}p-sha1(K1,K2), {body1}p-sha1(K1,K2)
MSG 4. B→A: UMI4, UMI3, A, ts4, (uuid1, ts2’),{sha1(UMI4),
sha1(UMI3), sha1(anonymous), sha1(ts4),
sha1(body2)}p-sha1(K1,K2), {body2}p-sha1(K1,K2)
After applying some Simplifying Transformations[17] to make it clearer we
obtained the following protocol:
MSG 1. A→B: UMI1, {UMI1, B, {K1}PK(B))}p-sha1(pass(A),NA),
sha1(password(A),NA) ), NA, {K1}PK(B)
MSG 2. B→A: {UMI1, UMI2, {K2}K1}SK(B),uuid1,{K2}K1
MSG 3. A→B: {UMI3, B, body1}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body1}p-sha1(K1,K2)
MSG 4. B→A: {UMI3, UMI4, body2}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body2}p-sha1(K1,K2)
We analysed this protocol using the Data Independence technique for mod-
elling inﬁnite runs of the protocol with the following Casper speciﬁcations:
Secret(A, body1, [B]) Secret(A, pass(A), [B])
Secret(B, body2, [A]) Agreement(A,B, [body1, K1])
These specify that agent A’s password and the body elements sent by both
parties are secret at the end of the protocol run. In addition, they specify that
body1 and the client (A) entropy correctly authenticated to the server (B).
We checked the data-independent model of this protocol on FDR and it failed
to ﬁnd any attacks. Since φ is safe, by the properties of the data-independent
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models we have therefore proved that this protocol is satisﬁes these speciﬁca-
tions for arbitrarily many runs in an arbitrarily large implementation.
However, when analysing the protocol with the following Casper authen-
tication speciﬁcation an attack was found.
Agreement(B,A, [body2, K2])
This speciﬁes that if A thinks he has successfully completed a run of the
protocol with B, then B has been previously running the protocol apparently
with A and B was the one who sent K2 and body2. The following attack is
found by FDR:
MSG 1α. A → IB : UMI1, {UMI1, B, {K1}PK(B))}p-sha1(pass(Alice),NA),
sha1(password(Alice),NA) ), NA, {K1}PK(B)
MSG 1β. I → B : UMI1, {UMI1, B, {K1}PK(B))}p-sha1(pass(I),NA),
sha1(password(I),NA) ), NA, {K1}PK(B)
MSG 2β. B → I : {UMI1, UMI2, {K2}K1}SK(B),uuid1,{K2}K1
MSG 2α. IB → A : {UMI1, UMI2, {K2}K1}SK(B),uuid1,{K2}K1
MSG 3α. A → IB : {UMI3, B, body1}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body1}p-sha1(K1,K2)
MSG 3β. I → B : {UMI3, B, body1}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body1}p-sha1(K1,K2)
MSG 4β. B → I : {UMI3, UMI4, body2}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body2}p-sha1(K1,K2)
MSG 4α. IB → A : {UMI3, UMI4, body2}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body2}p-sha1(K1,K2)
At the end of the protocol run, A believes she has completed a run of the
protocol with B using data items body2 and K2 where clearly B wasn’t aware
she was trying to communicate with him. This attack is possible on the
original protocol only if messages 3 and 4 are sent before the time stamps
expire (ts2′, ts3, ts4.)
The protocol in question binds messages to agents by by signing the WS-
Addressing [1] elements. The problem is that the latter speciﬁcation allows to
identify endpoints as “anonymous” instead of giving them meaningful URIs.
Since this is how the client (A) is identiﬁed by the WS-Addressing in this
protocol, the second message is not bound properly to her. This ﬂaw can be
ﬁxed, by including the client’s identity in the signatures of message 2.
Still, even if instead of “anonymous” the correct identity of the client is
signed, when analysing the WS-Trust of the protocol (First two messages)
with the following Casper authentication speciﬁcation an attack was found by
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FDR.
Agreement(A,B , [NA,UMI1 ])
This speciﬁes that if B thinks he has successfully completed a run of the WS-
Trust part of the protocol with A, then A has been previously running the
protocol apparently with B and A was the one who sent NA and UMI1 .
An intruder can intercept MSG 1 of a valid run of the protocol between
the service and a honest agent. The intruder can then re-send the message
large number of times to the service before the time stamp expires, making the
service allocate enormous number of security contexts. Using this method the
intruder accomplishes a denial-of-service attack forcing the service to allocate
all his resources and not being able to serve other agents.
It should be pointed out that the WSE platform has a “detect replay”
mechanism which prevents two RST messages from the same client. We were
able to exercise this attack since this mechanism was set oﬀ as a default. We
argue as follows that the solution to this ﬂaw should be a correct authenti-
cation of NA and UMI1 rather than mechanisms in the style of the detect
replay mechanism.
(i) Careless use of this protocol makes it prone to DOS attacks. An unexpe-
rienced user might not be aware of the implications of the detect replay
mechanism, leave it oﬀ and make his implementation vulnerable.
(ii) In case of an implementation with two servers (B), if a client (A) sends
MSG 1 to one of the servers the other server should be informed and
reject any attempt of connection by the same client.
(iii) The use of the detect replay mechanism suggests that every valid agent
can have only one session with the service. It may be the case that an
implementor would want his service to open several sessions with the
same client. If authentication of the RST was correct it would not be an
issue.
(iv) The detect replay mechanism in the WSE framework only works for
UsernameToken and will be extended to Kerberos ticket in the next ver-
sion. In addition the WSE can be conﬁgured with a custom replay de-
tection mechanisms. A correct protocol would work for any type of au-
thentication without the need of tailoring the detect replay mechanism.
A close inspection reveals that the WS-SecureConversation part of the protocol
(last two messages) suﬀers from the same ﬂaw. The WS-SecureConversation
was designed such that inﬁnite messages can be exchanged after the security
context establishment. In this case the same type of attack can be exercised
and the detect replay mechanism cannot prevent it.
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One possible solution for ﬁxing the ﬂaw without the detect replay mecha-
nism is to bind the RST message to the client using negotiation in the following
way:
MSG 1. A→B: Session Request
MSG 2. B→A: UMI0
MSG 3. A→B: {UMI0, UMI1, B, {K1}PK(B))}p-sha1(pass(A),NA),
sha1(password(A),NA), NA, {K1}PK(B)
MSG 4. B→A: {UMI1, UMI2, A, {K2}K1}SK(B),uuid1,{K2}K1
MSG 5. A→B: {UMI2, UMI3, B, body1}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body1}p-sha1(K1,K2)
MSG 6. B→A: {UMI3, UMI4, body2}p-sha1(K1,K2),{body2}p-sha1(K1,K2)
Alternatively a third message can be added in the original protocol, in
which the client (A) signs UMI2.
5.4 Reﬂections
It looks like it is impossible to authenticate correctly the RST when trying to
stick to the two step protocol run as is suggested in the WS-Trust speciﬁca-
tion. This may be the reason that the WSE team developed the detect replay
mechanism, believing that it is more important to stick to the speciﬁcation
than having the protocol ﬁxed in a conventional way.
The latter example suggests that WS-Trust should be mended or at least
a cautionary note ought to be added indicating the possible vulnerability of
the two step Security Context establishment.
A close look at the former attack indicates that perhaps it is due to incor-
rect implementation rather than mistaken design. The designers understood
the importance of binding and therefore the WS-Addressing ﬁelds were signed.
Ever since the ﬂawed implementation of APM [26] of a protocol proven correct
by Paulson [24], one of the goals of the formal veriﬁcation community was to
make it possible to analyse the implementation rather than the design. This
work was the ﬁrst step of achieving it in the Web Services world.
6 Related Work
Gordon and Pucella [16] proposed a security abstraction to RPC services in
which requests and responses are encoded as SOAP messages. This abstrac-
tion is modelled using an object calculus which its semantics is deﬁned by
pi-calculus. This approach is currently limited to checking authentication
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properties.
Bhargavan, Fournet, Gordon and Pucella developed a tool (TulaFale [18])
based on the Blanchet’s ProVerif [5]. The tool compiles a description of
SOAP-based security protocol and its properties into the pi-calculus and then
runs ProVerif to analyse it. At present it relies on a hand-coded description
of a protocol: there is no front end comparable to our function φ and its
automation. They choose to verify web service protocols at what it eﬀectively
a lower level, with their models being implemented at a level of abstraction
something like our Envelope type.
In [6] TulaFale speciﬁcation language was extended for modelling WS-
Trust and WS-SecureConversation based protocols. The authors point out
measures to be taken for correctly secure such protocols, some are similar to
the ﬂaws found in this paper (i.e. binding properly the messages to the sender
and detect replay messages.) Using our technique however, it was possible to
ﬁnd the subtle ﬂaw of binding the message using the WS-Addressing elements
and automatically detect the “replay” attack.
Damiani et al [13] propose an access control model for ﬂexible access to
SOAP based services, relying on a secure channel such as TLS/SSL.
7 Conclusion
That part of SOAP Message Security which lies outside of any cryptographic
operators may be constructed at will by any user, trustworthy or malicious.
There is nothing secret about it. So its purpose must be setting the parts of
messages which convey actual security in context, namely allowing the receiver
to see details of what the bit strings constituting signatures, encryptions,
hashes etc are meant to be.
Since Kerckhoﬀ’s Known Design Principle is adopted by most if not all
crypto-analysts, the extra information about the structure of the messages
given by the XML-tagging is assumed anyway in abstract models used for
the analysis of security protocols. In other words the tagging provides an
implementation of what this style of work assumes, usually implicitly. What
we have provided is an automated way of moving from the speciﬁc XML
tagging structure to familiar abstract protocols in a way such that attacks can
be translated to and forth.
We have already shown in [14] that there are some interesting ways in which
SOAP can assist security by providing degree of protection against type ﬂaw
attacks. In future work we hope to provide a more precise characterisation of
this.
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